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REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY: SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND EUROPEAN REINTEGRATION

Abstract

Paper aims to observe the German case of reunification, starting from the descriptive summary of the initial German separation plan of 1943, and its predominant driving factors both domestically and internationally. For the purposes of this research microeconomic performances of both former Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter FRG) and German Democratic Republic (hereinafter GDR) are assessed through statistical data analysis of such related aspects as: life satisfaction, labor division and migration. Following chapter discusses the ideological influences of the Soviet and the Western frontiers over the separated Germany and aims to observe any visible manifestations of those dichotomous schools of thought. Based on the literature analysis paper goes on to argue that other than ideology there was an evident psychological and social dimension to the outside pressure. It also concentrates on German European integration policy as a high priority on German foreign policy agenda since its reunification in early 1990s. Causes of German reunification are addressed through the lens of three predominant IR theories: realism, liberalism and constructivist school of thought. This chapter tries to answer why Germany chose to concentrate on European integration rather than inhabiting a more aggressive and self-centered foreign policy discourse and tries to provide possible explanations based on above mentioned theoretical approaches. By analyzing the political debate one can assume that the action taken by Germany proved to coincide with a widely consolidated supranational European identity. In those particular cases when they didn't coincide, widespread criticism and subsequent corrective responses were launched. German reunification is a paramount case which serves as a unique and timeless example of how the well-planned regional reintegration strategy can be utilized to benefit multiple actors involved.

Keywords: *Separation of Germany, Berlin Wall, GDR, FRG, European reintegration, Reunification of Germany, consequences of reunification.*

Introduction

According to the original Article 23 of the federal constitution of Germany: the event that occurred in 1990 is defined as the merged German Democratic Republic (GDR) also known as East Germany, into the jurisdiction of German Federal Republic (FRG) or West Germany. This event marked one of the significant developments in the later stages of the Cold War and is considered as one of the fundamentally important victories of the Western Powers against the Soviet Block. The ongoing process of active Soviet dissolution provided an opportunity for many Post-Soviet nations to redefine their international position and emancipate from the Soviet influence.

Through literature, statistical data and content analysis of the German as well as international political leaders, the article aims to observe cultural, ideological, economic and social impact over the "two Germanies" during the

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time of German separation and after the reunification. It's fundamentally important to identify patterns of conduct coming from the external influential actors for the purposes of maintaining control over the German society. German reunification is a case of vast geopolitical magnitude. It is significant to observe not only locally but also through the lens of global and regional economic integration, by answering on a couple of basic questions: what benefits can integration actually provide and what are the deterring issues around it?

Circumstances behind the German separation

The historical context of separating Germany into several areas of control dates back to the end of WWII. The main task for the parties involved was to promote demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decentralization of power within Germany. Fearing German revival and hoping to avoid the rebirth of Hitler the Allied Powers agreed that the Soviets would take the eastern part of Germany and the USA, Great Britain and France would control the West. Subsequently, Berlin was split into four realms of control.

However, this case of occupation was a unique phenomenon in the sense that each one of those four occupants retained absolute autonomy in their successive areas of control; in addition, the decisions had to be made on the basis of the principle of unanimity. It's worth noting that soon after this event The Cold War was initiated and in 1948 the Soviets started the blockade of Western Berlin, which forced the allied powers to provide supplies through utilizing their air forces. Under the framework of economic reform, Deutsche Mark was introduced within the areas of western control. German territory turned into a zone of political as well as economic warfare.

The gradual sequence of developments led to establishing two separate states in 1949 Western Germany (FRG) and Eastern Germany (GDR). Therefore, newly created German states acquired only partial sovereignty and each of them was subordinated to their successive patrons, on one side Atlantic partners and European actors and on the other the countries of Warsaw Pact. Germany became an ideological battleground between the western principle of liberal capitalism and communist collectivism. No treaty has been agreed on, however as the winners of WWII, Western Allies acquired their exclusive political and socio-economic influence over the fate of Germany (Heineck & Süssmuth 2010).

It is also worth emphasizing that the allocation of authorities to external forces within Germany didn't occur by chance. On the contrary, the foreign ministers of the UK, USA and USSR foresaw the Nazi defeat and at the Moscow Conference of 1943, they agreed on the creation of the European Advisory Commission. Its main task was to anticipate and observe possible outcomes of the postwar developments (Lang 2017). In accordance with the pre-defined scenario, Germany would have to be divided into two entities the territories historically included within the German empire and those which were part of the state of Prussia. It is worth noting that people living on those territories inherited somewhat different political, economic as well as cultural identities. The strategy of such division was aimed at further segregating and neutralizing the threat of Nazi union.

Advisory Commission provided its recommendations which became the basis for London Protocol of 1944, according to which Germany would be separated into equal units and each zone was initially designated to the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However, some amendments have been made later on and Great Britain and USA compromised parts of their domains for French control; in addition Poland under the patronage from USSR also got involved in controlling some portion of Eastern Germany.

Even though it was observed as a very negative phenomenon, developments between 1949 and 1990 provided an exclusive opportunity to analyze and assess the differences between the effects of two major ideological, geopolitical as well as economic rivals onto the general well-being, economic and political behavior of the German people, both prior and after the unification.

It is easy to deduce that the economic performance and social welfare of Eastern Germany were significantly lagging behind. Prior to reunification living standards of the citizens of FRG were significantly better than of their compatriots in the eastern part. There's more than enough proof in the scientific literature that living under the soviet influence didn't only cause structural and bureaucratic changes, but it went as far as impacting behavioral patterns of Eastern citizens even after the reunification.

Comparing economic performances of GDR and FRG

The economic merger of previously separated German republics is an exemplary case for observing any economic approximation of neighboring regions let alone states. GDR has drastically benefited from the initial fruits of the reunification, namely by acquiring the solid and modern structures of legislative, socio-economic and political institutions from the better developed German Federal Republic. We can assume that this factor has saved GDR tremendously valuable time, effort and resources and has emancipated them from the general struggles underwent by other transitioning Post-Soviet states. More precisely enjoying the immediate benefits that reunification had to offer, was made much easier due to the inherent linguistic and social connectivity among two states. The case of German reunification served as a fuel, implying that it can be observed as an archetypal precedent not only for its immediate neighbors, but for the economic integration of the Europe as a whole (Burda & Hunt 2001).

The economic performance of Eastern and Western lands of Germany didn't differ dramatically during the pre-WWII period, however by the time of reunification Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter GDP) per capita of GDR's was estimated to be half of Western Germany (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln 2007) (Shleifer et al. 2006). Eastern Germany also noticeably lagged behind in the area of labor productivity, which was roughly one-third of the Western indicator, putting GDR in the same segment of states as Chile and Mexico. The Communist economic system appeared to lead Eastern Germany into an economic crisis, therefore the majority of the Eastern capital resources were not fit for utilization in capital economic model (Siebert & Horst 1991) (Akerlof et al. 1991).




Figure 3 Sascha O. Becker, Lukas Margele, and Ludger Woessmann, 2020. "The Separation and Reunification of Germany: Rethinking a Natural Experiment Interpretation of the Enduring Effects of Communism". *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, volume 34, pages: 143-171

Studying the real life implications of life satisfaction has progressively been obtained from classical psychological school by other disciplines. Economists have gradually come to the conclusion that its affects are not only visible at individual levels, but it also influences such broader aspects of statehood as accumulative effectiveness of the labor force. Therefore, certain causal relationship has been established between life satisfaction and productivity.

According to (Clark & Oswald, 1994) unemployment directly impacts the life satisfaction of citizens, while the effect of income on it is rather clouded. Hence, these were important preconditions affecting the life satisfaction of

GDR's working age population. However, data doesn't suggest that those observed unemployed citizens are not typically the saddest people, confirming that unemployment in GDR was mostly involuntary and out of one's control.

Throughout the first decade after the reunification, significant improvements in life satisfaction of Eastern Germans have been observed in both sexes. It can be stressed that the improved individual mobility, newly acquired rights and opportunities, better social services and well-structured, citizen-oriented systems have played a major role in this process (Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields 2004).

Labor division between Genders in FRG and GDR

Separation of German state had its consequences on particular aspects of economic conduct, which was especially evident with regards to division of work load among genders. Throughout the period of separation, female citizens of GDR were incentivized to be as productive as their male compatriots, while in FRG the gender roles were more inclined towards conservative understanding of the society. In West Germany men were expected to be earners and women were trusted with traditional family-related chores and raising children. Thereafter, females in GDR attained more equality in employment than those living in FRG. Crompton (1999) proposed that the Western and Eastern German social models were a sequence between social conservative male-earner/female-care giver setting and an idealized model of dual-breadwinner/dual care giver, which resulted in deviations in gender equality in labor market among those two states.

According to Crompton (1999), the first model has dominated the industrial societies from later stages of XIX century up until the mid XX century. However, it should be stressed that each arrangement in its perfect form is hard to find in modern world, due to the fact that most societies represent a mix of the above mentioned two models.

In times of separation, the "two Germanies" incentivized their female citizens to coordinate their caregiving as well as maternal roles and employment activities differently. GDR's government motivated and even demanded mothers to become an active participants of the country's labor force, which was justified by the necessities of their homeland (Kunzler et al. 2001) (Trappe 1996). It is possible to stress that GDR has reached the highest level of gender equality within labor force among other socialist systems. Therefore, it was most successful in harmonizing the roles of producer and reproducer (Einhorn 1993). However, on the contrary the female citizens of FRG were mainly part time workers. It's also worth noting that the majority of female workers in GDR were employed by the state, while the wages of Westerners were determined by market competition and based on general guidelines (Krueger & Pischke 1995).

Rapid collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1980-ies, served as a driving force for the downfall of socialist systems around the globe, including GDR. During the separation period the two states had fundamentally divergent ideas about the gender roles. However, after the merger of the "two Germanies", GDR was literally overridden by the leadership of FRG, giving birth to the process of radical reformation of the GDR's political, economic and institutional settings. Division of labor roles between genders was impacted much more drastically in Eastern Germany, which led to its partial approximation to the western model.

It's logical to ask: why do individuals or large groups of people choose to apply certain patterns of labor division between sexes? More precisely, why do Brits or Finns abide by dual breadwinner-type setting within their families, while Italians prefer more conservative division of gender roles? There might be multiple answers to this question, ranging from specific historical socio-cultural patterns, influenced and molded throughout centuries to present economic challenges. However, for the purposes of our observation, it would be more suitable to formulate this question in this way: what were the reasons behind diverging patterns of labor division between genders during the separated years, and what's the reason for the partial approximation since reunification?

There can be several explanations for that. First of all, many scholars rightfully argue that the state's public policy has its undeniable effect on gender issues in general. However, some authors tend to concentrate on economic arrangements, sectoral and generic market systems as main influencing factors over the societal labor division outcomes. Others try to find answers by observing cultural codes, which they believe is the pivotal factor in constructing social norms and communal ideas. Lastly, some scholars decisively adhere to the experiences of the past, in other words historical heritage plays a central role in shaping social patterns (Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004). Herewith, the fundamental logical argument which effectively sums up why Easterners lived according

to more conservative labor division patterns and why they changed their preference resulting in approximation with the Western pattern is external ideological influence. More conservative labor division behavior was observable within the Soviet Union. Women were brought up to be good wives. Their primary mission in life was to reproduce and keep the household well-organized. And, if they were involved in labor activities it was mainly in agrarian or medical sector. There were no successful female mainstream political decision-makers, engineers or scientists because societal norms demanded different kind of devotion from them. Therefore, GDR being under the heavy Soviet ideological pressure during the divided years acquired or were subconsciously manipulated by media and other mechanisms of mass control to inhabit more conservative behavioral patterns of their patron. After the reunification, however, observing the failure of Communism and the absolute mayhem experienced by majority of Eastern European states since "Perestroika", Eastern Germans saw that this economic model was not compatible within the industrialized and technologically advanced international economic system, thereafter, they started to converge to more western value-based societal setting.

Migration between GDR and FRG

Other than employment satisfaction and salaries, psychological as well as societal influences play significant roles while observing the causes of migration. Evidence suggests that before 1989 larger share of East-to-West migrants consisted of female citizens living in GDR. Gradually, more and more young and skilled portion of Eastern German population started to move Westward. Young and educated people were most likely to become permanent Western inhabitants rather than older and married Easterners. It could be explained by more freedom for youngsters that faced no significant attachments to their place of residence, while older people had families, therefore it was harder for them to live everything behind at once and move to the Western Germany. Eventually, data suggests that permanent migrants at any stage are characterized with rather high life satisfaction than those leaving GDR temporarily (Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln 2009) (Hunt 2002).




Figure 4 Own calculation based on administrative data from the German Statistical Office

Political and ideological impact

As already mentioned, Soviet influence has spread its roots way beyond the facade. It didn't stop merely at the stage of economic setting or institutional management; it appeared to have much more long-lasting effect which influenced populations' economic behavior decades after the reunification. The Communist influence spread over such areas as entrepreneurial behavior, activities within the stock market, popular attitudes towards savings, and citizens' expectations towards inflation. Explaining such outcome is not an easy task, however observing more or less directly the effects of communist ideology is still feasible.

Ideologists of the Soviet economic model regarded such concepts as investment and stock market as representations of decaying and corrupt western capitalism. Ongoing active soviet propaganda was actively promoting collective economic model and was deeming everything western as rotten and deprived of ethical foundation. Even in 2000-s Germans living on the territory of former GDR invest significantly less portion of their capital into stocks (Laudenbach et al. 2020). However, there are some observable irregularities among the certain part of former GDR citizens who experienced greater oppression from the Soviet forces on the basis of their religious identity, or lacked access to television sources; thereafter their pattern of economic conduct is rather deviated from the soviet influence standards.

Several prominent scholars have also observed whether citizens living under the communist influence have been permanently influenced in terms of forming personal political proclivities. Studies of behavior show that in the political context the actions of citizens from Eastern Germany differ from the inhabitants of Western Germany. Their ideological perceptions about capitalist economic systems are predominantly negative. They also have distinct views on the role of central governments in providing social care, health insurance or distribution of wealth among the general population (Alesina &

Fuchs-Schündeln 2007).

Generally speaking the factor of trust among social actors plays a crucial role in economic conduct (Arrow & Robert 1972). The majority of citizens from Eastern Germany have been characterized with a lower level of trust toward others which is not a positive precondition for social convergence. Evidence also shows that lower rate of church service attendance in a pre-WWII period has negatively impacted the development of intense communal relationship. Therefore Eastern German citizens were less likely to interact and form meaningful social connections (Rainer & Siedler 2009). Another scientific argument in support for lower trust argument can be deduced from the fact that East Germans tend to invest more within the close circles of friends rather than with people they have weaker connections to. Additionally, East Germans have been exhibiting lower levels of self-reliance and confidence (Boenisch & Schneider, 2013). However, trust towards institutions has been increasing and East Germans have converged to become more risk taking after the reunification (Heineck & Süßmuth 2013).

It is possible to neglect these biases on the basis of existing historical, social or religious precondition; however, some authors observe even more meticulous behavioral patterns than that of general mistrust among East Germans. As a continuation of Soviet influence over consumption patterns, scholars argue that reunification brought new possibilities for the Easterners. Therefore, they began showcasing noticeable consumption patterns such as: spending more money on goods that signal higher status within the community (Friehe & Mechtel 2014). Furthermore, it is evident that after the reunification when larger supply of consumer goods became available, citizens of GDR preferred to consume more peculiar food and generally gained rather more weight than the Westerners (Dragone & Ziebarth 2017).

East Germans have also been characterized by high willingness to pay taxes, which correlates with their strong proclivity towards equal distribution of wealth among the citizens and high reliance of central government to do so (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln 2007). In addition, it has also been observed that citizens of GDR expressed a higher level of dissatisfaction about such issues as unemployment, which is a clear trace of Soviet influence based on the Soviet propagandist assumption that there was virtually no unemployment within the Soviet Union.

Social and psychological consequences

In 1961, in accordance with the state orders, new social order was established. Families were divided and relatives could only communicate through letters, which were closely monitored by state security agencies. It deepened the sense of separation and transformed familial relationships into abstract and chore-like routine.

Furthermore, family members on different sides of border between the two German states could only visit each other on rare occasions. Border crossing and the duration of appointments were closely monitored and large payments were required. Exchanging gifts among relatives became an opportunity to signal West's economic superiority in comparison to the East. Westerners inhabited a role of 'wealthy distant relatives', meanwhile the Easterners had to put up with the constant shame of being under inferior conditions and reliant on somebody else.

For GDR's citizens, having a relative in FRG meant an unmatched opportunity to be in touch with the news from the outside world. Receiving Western German Marks as a gift was a remarkable occasion for them, because it meant that they could purchase some VIP goods through so called "intershops", which were established in big hotels for foreign visitors. Even such sad occasions as funerals of their Western peers became a celebratory holiday for GDR citizens, because it was one of those rare and momentous rituals which they had a state clearance to attend.

Westerners felt as if they were objectified for what they could offer (products, money, opportunity, information etc.), while Easterners were continuously trapped in a psychological prison of being indebted, inferior and dependent. This complex societal setting had its subtle but significant influence on populations on both sides of The Berlin Wall.

Events of early 1990-ies forced this pattern to fade away. Up until reunification relationships were largely molded by outside factors, while afterwards material reasons for communication were gradually taken out of the equation and it became a sole responsibility of individuals to obtain and maintain supportive psychological ties with their reunited families. They faced a new challenge to reformulate their relationships based on the fundamental principles of decency, trust and honesty.

According to Thomas Krauss and Angelika Faas (1994) these types of political events can be characterized with the duality of the observation subject, implying that broader social dimensions find their manifestations at the individual levels. More precisely, clinical psychology suggests that the individual psychological disturbances become symptomatic characteristics of the ongoing broader social conditioning.

In other words, the deeply ingrained concepts of living in a more developed or freedom deprived Germany, having more confidence in their future, being morally and economically superior or inferior, were pushed down German citizens' throats by the outside influences through intense ideological and psychological warfare.

Ongoing psychosocial narratives of idealizing the West or antagonizing and marginalizing the East, were provided and reinforced by the mass media sources, which at that time also served as irreplaceable tools for spreading propaganda. Guaranteeing these identities offered a reliable mechanism of dividing and controlling the populations of "two Germanies". Idealizing something unconsciously leads to worshipping the ideal and fighting anything that threatens it. In this political context, ideal needs to be kept away for it to maintain its essence; because once it becomes part of our being in one way or another it ceases its existence. Therefore, in order to fundamentally feel secure and at peace, an ideal or a negative concept that has been identified and reinforced by outside pressure can never be integrated and must always stay foreign to the predefined perceptions of "me" or "us".

In this case, antagonizing the "other" is the only way through which individuals or groups can ensure the survival of their own identities. Therefore, the Easterners formed a robust perception of their Western compatriots portraying them as followers of fundamentally rotten ideology, identifying everything Western with profit-driven, egoistic and selfish qualities. On the other hand, citizens of FRG equated GDR with utopian and outdated ideas, which forced them to live lives deprived of individuality and abide by the norms inserted by their central authorities.

Interesting detail about such arrangement is that subconsciously, the negative "other" is in a constant need for punishment and degradation. In order to prevent the antagonist from spreading its influence over "the self" it must be kept under continual pressure. This principle can also be applied to the whole Cold War era, when the fear of an opponent surpassing the expected limits drove entire nations into paranoia and perpetual arms raise. Shaping and antagonizing these identities was heavily reinforced by the television and newspapers at that time.

Based on his clinical practice a psychotherapist Hans Joachim Maaz, of Halle (1990) argued that Stalin's system had a detrimentally negative affect on the subconscious of GDR citizens. After observing more than 5 000 cases, he came to the conclusion that the deprivation of freedom and absence of particular goods and services resulted in strong feelings of dissatisfaction, sometimes even character deformities. GDR population has adapted to living under constant surveillance and lack of leeway by showing signs of extra conformity and lack of independent thinking or action. He argued that the Easterners were deprived of primordial psychological support such as unconditional parental love and undeserved validation by their peers and parents, from the very young ages. It was evident that this type of circumstances would not give birth to open-minded and creative characters, but mostly resulted in forming a compulsive and obedient personality (Krauss & Faas, 1994).

European integration policy of Germany since reunification

Events of 1990s turned the global geopolitical order upside down. Dissolution of USSR led to the EU transforming from a regional western institution into the all-European organization. EU shifted its orientation from deepening towards widening its geopolitical capabilities alongside with its institutional complexity. Since reunification Germany was faced with variety of issues to tackle: taking care of approximately 16 million new citizens from GDR under the heavy influence of the Soviets, GDR's communist party to deal with, to manage economic reconstruction and domestic as well as international reintegration after the decades of antagonism and mistrust. FRG was not obliged by any means to pursue the path of deepening European integration, not mentioning the soviet influenced GDR. However irrational it might seem German political leaders still chose to build a trustworthy supranational identity rather than focus on its national, ego-driven ambitions. This led to Germany transforming into one of the biggest promoters of the idea to enhance collaboration on the issue of including Eastern European states into the European family. Several pivotal questions arise while discussing Germany's foreign policy orientation. It's crucial to assess even though heavily damaged after the WWII but still with enormous economic and military potential why did Germany choose to concentrate on European integration rather than inhabiting a more aggressive and self-centered foreign policy course? Neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought would plainly suggest explanations based on their highly pragmatic emphasis on specific international power balance as well as domestic socio-political institutional setting. However, these IR theories fail to provide a deep and meaningful analysis of the influential factors over Germany's decision to stay true to its European integration policy. Constructivist assessment of this historical event on the other hand, concentrates on the German state identity shaped throughout a very turbulent past as a detrimental factor over its stance within the international puzzle of influences (Banchoff 1999).

Constructivists claim that state identity is best manifested during its conduct of foreign policy. However, it's in the context of the observation it is necessary to mention the duality of opinions even among Constructivist scholars. Some scholars believe that national identity in other words the concept of „Us“ - is exclusively shaped from within (Anderson 1991) (Smith 1991). Others claim that it is a fundamentally external attribute of the state (Katzenstein 1997b). Therefore, one can conclude that national identity is not a static concept, on the contrary it is an ever evolving notion molded under the pressure of historical experiences and manifested differently under specific international constellations.

When assessing the formation process of state identity Banchoff provides a framework of initial analytical tasks to be considered. In order to effectively observe the process of identity shaping one should take notice of four fundamentally important areas of analysis (Banchoff 1999): Firstly, the realm of policy conduct should be clearly defined. It is necessary in order not to get lost into the avalanche of empirical data about the past experiences derived from multi-level interactions between the states (Barnett 1993).

Secondly, it is of vital importance to focus on acquiring the evidence which corresponds with the chosen field. For example: if one concentrates on political realm, then the opinions of main decision-makers, speeches of the heads of political parties, public political debates can be considered relevant. These individual aspects play a major role in forming an archetype of the shared identity, therefore link between the data and the subject matter of observation should be maintained.

Thirdly, one should carry out a thorough assessment of congruence between the state's behavior and its national identity (Bennett & Alexander 2005). Identity as an isolated phenomenon is deprived of meaning for the purposes of observing state's position within the international constellation of power. In other words declared identity

without a corresponding action turns into a meaningless statement. The narratives manifested in the speeches of national leaders are not merely the descriptive statements, but they create the crucial foundation for acquiring and pursuing particular international discourse. For instance a positive assessment of NATO's role in maintaining peace during the postwar period might be perceived as a message towards maintaining and deepening the selected security policy arrangements. On the contrary, describing the involvement of NATO during the post-WWII Europe from the lens of strengthening the American dominance on the continent provides different path to pursue.

Finally, while congruence assessment of the relationship between national identity and international stance can seem satisfactory, it is not always fully exhaustive. Therefore, an incongruence test needs to be conducted in order to detect and minimize any irregularities between state's officially declared narrative and its actual behavior.

Since reunification Germany was faced with numerous challenges most evident of which was to balance between the influences of global hegemony at that time USA, Russia and France, notwithstanding the necessity of highly effective policy towards NATO and the EU. Out of multiple options, Germany chose to pursue the path of forging its multilateral international security identity (Berger 1996). Observing the ongoing influential narratives after the Cold War in Germany is possible through analyzing Bundestag debates regarding implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. Position of Helmut Kohl is especially worthy of consideration with respect to pursuing the path of deepening EU integration process. He emphasized that: 'the support for German Identity and European Integration was necessary to underscore that Germans remained faithful to what we have always said, namely that German and European unity are two sides of the same coin' (Banchoff 1999).

Throughout four major debates between 1991 and 1994 preceding the German presidency of the European Union, Kohl actively argued that in order to guarantee peace, economic well-being and socio-cultural sustainability, Europe needed to be more united than ever. He further stated that it was in Germany's best interests to be part of the consolidated European family (Bundestag debates 1992). The four debates particularly emphasized on an evident consensus within Germany towards its supranational European identity.

Kohl was quite skeptical towards an alternative scenario, because he believed that the collapse of European unity would promote the reemergence of self-centered, egoistic, distrust-driven regional as well as global constellation. For Kohl Franco-German partnership was an indispensable option leading not only to growing together economically but politically as well. He further stated that European integration was the only pathway for peaceful coexistence after the centuries of rivalries and bloodshed among the neighboring nations of the continent.

It's worthy of attention that the heads of Christian Democratic Union of Germany (hereinafter CDU)/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (hereinafter CSU)-Free Democratic Party (hereinafter FDP) coalition and Social Democratic Party of Germany (hereinafter SPD) didn't perceive Germany as a sovereign actor within the international system. They conversely believed that FRG was simply a part of a global puzzle which consisted of well-defined rules of conduct and the pivotal sense of shared sovereignty. Minister of Foreign Affairs from FDP Hans Dietrich Genscher emphasized the significance of shared sovereignty especially in the security and foreign policy realms.

Gunther Verhaugen who was SPD foreign policy spokesman at that time stressed on the importance of certain sacrifice. He addressed the German audience stating that it was necessary to realize Germany could not "win" in every outcome and it was quite acceptable in the spirit of European unity.

Involvement of Germany's strongest immediate neighbor was significant in directing Germany's future position within the region. Jean Monnet was one of the initial political figures who promoted French involvement in planning FRG's development. He believed that the direct agreement between USA and West Germany would pose a threat to French foreign policy interests. Monnet deeply believed that France had an important role to play in the process of German reintegration within the European family. In this regard the initial long-term deal known as Schuman Plan was elaborated aiming to enhance the creation of a well-known European Coal and Steel Community by May of 1950. European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter ECSC) served as a great tool through which previously enemies (Benelux, Germany, France and Italy) could now interact and shape shared values. Chancellor Adenauer and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman shared the position that ECSC was much more than just an economic cooperation dealing with coal and steel resources, they believed it was rather a political significance of the organization that provided unique opportunities of shared growth and development for the parties involved. Regardless, there were fair share of skeptics who foresaw Schuman Plan as a massive fraud, SPD representative Carlo Schmidt even compared the idea of ECSC to the Treaty of Versailles, which was aimed at degrading and subjugating Germany to external control (Banchoff 1999a).

German integration through the lens of major IR theories

The collapse of the USSR and the gradual secession of US presence in the region transformed FRG into the central economic and geopolitical power in Europe. The dissolve of the Warsaw Pact and ongoing changes within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter CSCE) and the EU posed new challenges for German political leadership. Furthermore, the responsibility of reintegrating GDR into the FRG, posed an enormous challenge within itself, triggering the need for drastic institutional and socio-economic changes domestically. Despite these regional and global structural changes, the dedication of Germany towards its declared EU policy goals remained steady. Similarly to the 1980s, the FRG took active measures to express its desire for deepening economic and foreign policy ties with the rest of European nations. Post-Cold War constellation undoubtedly made Germany stronger from both absolute, as well as relative perspectives.

Liberal approach stresses that not much has changed after German reunification. PDS of Eastern Germany couldn't counterbalance the weight of stronger western German parties' influence the CDU, SPD as well as Free Democrats. Therefore, liberal school is limited by shallow explanation and cannot fully comprehend the deep desire of German leaders to pursue European integration strategy notwithstanding the widespread skeptical attitude among the significant number of German population.

On the other hand, based on the historical evidence, realists would assume that Germany would be enchanted with the deep desire for retaliation. Due to the reshaping of the bipolar world order, neorealism would foresee drastic changes in the international placement of Germany, predicting the proclivity towards nationalist regional hegemony. Furthermore, taking into consideration the incomparable military manufacturing capacity Germany had a sizable chance of succeeding in pursuing nationalism-oriented policy orientation. However, this also came out not to be the case.

Case of German reintegration into the European family was an incomparable one, because there was no other precedent of the regional integration when the defeated state pursues the path of reintegrating with former enemies through compromises and even sacrifices its sovereignty.

Liberal approach concentrated on post 1990 uncertainty within Europe shaping the unstable institutional as well as political transition towards emerging new balance of power. The dissolution of Warsaw Pact, together with strengthening of NATO and weakening the Soviet influences throughout Eastern Europe were expected to dictate the direction of German foreign policy which altered its European course. As one of the dominant powers of the European continent FRG was expected to cope with new challenges in a robust manner. However, Germany shifted its focus towards taking active measures for rebuilding stronger and more peaceful Europe. FRG endorsed Single European Act in 1980 - way before the collapse of the 'Berlin Wall', manifesting its declared desire for deeper EU integration into plausible action. Furthermore, in 1988 Kohl government had declared that becoming a part of an emerging monetary union was one of the primary goals for Germany, stating its unconditional enthusiasm before reunification occurred (Anderson & Goodman 1993). Finance Minister of FRG Theo Waigel was against the idea that Germany should be responsible for financially supporting EU's expansion towards Eastern Europe, therefore due to the sizeable popular skepticism Kohl was obliged to minimize his usual references of 'United States of Europe' (Anderson 1997).

FRG was one of the initiators to take active measures for NATO's expansion and Eastern European states to be included in EU's enlargement agenda. FRG continued to be very vocal about Visegrad countries' accession into EU during mid-1990s as well.

In the epicenter of Germany's ambition to realize Maastricht goals was the consolidated notion of 'self-binding' (Hellmann 1997). Concept implies that, in order to regain international trust, Germany had to prove to its immediate neighbors as well as the international community that it could effectively control its goals, ambitions and power after the reunification. Some scholars believed that German leaders endorsed Economic and Monetary Union (hereinafter EMU) in 1990 because they wanted to seem as a loyal devotee to the principles of European Community (Grieco 1995). However, it's worthy of mentioning that this supranational European narrative didn't appear at once out of nowhere within FRG (Banchoff 1999a).

According to the constructivist judgment, Germany's external policy goals were synchronized with its domestic material interests. Constructivist analysis states that FRG's political spectrum had a consensus on its European

Identity because it was foreseen in the context of wealth, economic and institutional stability above all. Therefore, political leaders convinced their public that it was of central importance for FRG to become one of the key actors within the European family, especially in the wake of reunification. On the other hand they believed that inhabiting a more unilateral policy would threaten Germany's future development and cause the same mistakes that Germany had made after the WWI, eventually leading to rise of nationalistic proclivities and complete isolation from international system. As the member of SPD Wieczorek-Zeul expressed: 'Europe said yes to German unity; we say yes to European unity' (Banchoff 1999).

After the reunification during 1990s, German actions proved noticeably compatible with its expressed supranational identity. The Kohl government advocated for Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter CFSP), EMU, and enhanced EU institutional arrangement during the 1990-1 Maastricht negotiations. In the years that followed, regardless of difficulties related to ratification process among other nations and an unexpectedly slow pace of economic rehabilitation, the ERG embarked to support enhanced integration throughout following EU summits. And at the 1996-7 Inter-governmental EU Summit, German representatives from across the German political system with the evident exceptions of Gerhard Schroder representing the SPD and Edmund Stoiber of the Bavarian CSU – enthusiastically expressed their dedication towards deepening the economic and political cooperation in most areas under discussion.

The underlining narratives of Stoiber and Schroder's refusal to comply with further integration process was derived from fear of sacrificing national sovereignty on behalf of the union's agenda. During 1993 Bundestag debate, Stoiber stressed on the necessity for more self-reliant and confident 'formulation of national interests'. However, this view was quickly outweighed by the views of the integration proponents.

Hence by analyzing ongoing political debate one can conclude than action taken by Germany proved to coincide with a widely consolidated supranational European identity. In those particular cases when they didn't coincide, widespread criticism and subsequent corrective responses were triggered immediately. The constructivists argue that German EU integration policy during the 1990s was harmonized with its material interests as well. Single currency and closer political integration posed significant economic benefits for Germany. Therefore, this was one of the most influential preconditions for FRG's political leaders to gain popular support in reaching public consensus even in the midst of such a remarkable and challenging event as reunification.

Conclusion

Initially, the talks on German reunification appeared threatening to its European neighbors, because of the evident reasons: they feared reemergence of German state and rebirth of strong German economy which would inevitably redeem for all that has been done to it. They would be more at peace with two separated German states, with weak economies and conflicting ideological stances. French side even expressed worries that Gorbachev's so-called 'Glasnost' would turn Eastern Germany towards the wrong direction. Soviet Union had to concentrate mainly on political turmoil which emerged within the Eastern Europe, which gave Germany more space for taking care of its own problems and dealing with the issue of reunification and declared pro-European state identity formation relatively free of external interference from the already collapsing USSR.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher openly voiced her opinion against the rapid reunification of Germany, she felt threatened that due to its geopolitical location, economic potential and size united Germany would radically reshape the European political and power balance. Furthermore, she feared that the Soviet Party hardliners would receive this act as a humiliating and degrading message sent by the West, which would further propel the already complex and exhausting process of the ongoing Cold War towards a deadlock, in other words a point of no return.

Luckily for Germany, against all odds and against the will of hard-liner communist party members, Gorbachev openly voiced his desire to reunify German states into one country. Moreover, Soviet foreign minister at that time Eduard Shevardnadze instigated Eastern Germans not to wait any longer. This strategy was heavily criticized by current Russian president Vladimir Putin. He expressed that Gorbachev's approach to the German issue was a weak and mistaken one, which costed Soviet Union the loss of security guarantees not only in Eastern Germany but in Poland as well as within the geopolitically priceless CEE region.

In retrospect, regardless of the multiple above mentioned deterring factors and actors, well-planned, pragmat-

ic and well-consolidated foreign as well as domestic policy resulted in German reunification and Germany acquired the role of one of the central figures within the emerging European Unity.

In May 1980, the Western powers expressed their desire to see united strong Germany as an integral part of the democratic European family. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 didn't only have regional significance; it was a beginning of a much broader sequence of events, redefining the balance of power in the world. This symbolic act was not merely the sign of German reunification but it signified the elimination of the so called "Iron Curtain" which was erected between the two ideological, political and economic frontiers of the world. The end of the Cold War was announced days after the fall of Berlin wall and Germany was finally reunified a year after.

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