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**GREENLAND'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY:
CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING ON GOVERNMENTAL AND
SOCIETAL LEVELS**

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to identify and explain the rationale behind Greenland's decision to leave the European Economic Community. The reasoning follows the two-levelled analysis of decision-making: governmental and societal. Based on the Process Tracing of Greenland's way to the self-determination and Discourse Analysis of the 1982 pre-referendum campaign, the article affirms that the interest of the autonomy expansion backed by the plan of economic well-being outside the Community encouraged the governmental decision, while on the societal level, the interest of preserving Greenlandicness against Europeanization is claimed to have been decisive. Findings are simultaneously interpreted according to Alexander Wendt's National Interest categories of autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem to conclude that the withdrawal from the Community was a reverberation of Greenland's national interests in their Constructivist sense. As a complement to Wendt's conceptualization of National Interests, Weaver's Securitization Theory is used as a theoretical tool for analysing the pre-referendum campaign as a securitization act. It is argued that the government directed Greenlanders' Collective self-esteem against the EEC membership and thus constructed the societal security threat out of a purely political issue.

Keywords: *Greenland, Brexit, EU, Withdrawal, Securitization.*

Introduction

On the referendum of February 23, 1982 Greenland, which is an autonomous part of Denmark (the Community of the Realm), opted for the termination of its membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1985, Greenland officially ceased to be a member of the EEC and since then has been carrying the status of the *Overseas Countries and Territories* (OCT). This fact makes the world's largest island the first territorial unit to have ever left the European Union². Furthermore, as Greenland's withdrawal from the EEC did not represent a member state's exit, but rather of a territory within it, this case remains *sui generis* even after the Brexit took place, and represents a puzzle of the foreign policy decision-making.

This article offers a qualitative research on the reasons behind Greenland's decision to withdraw from the EEC

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² Greenland is commonly acknowledged (by the EU itself) as the only territorial unit within the member state country to have ever withdrawn from the EU (EEC that time). "The case has no real precedent", - reads the Commission Communication on the status of Greenland, February 2, 1983. However, other comparable examples could include Algeria (France colony at that time), that ceased to be EEC member upon its independence in 1962 and Saint-Barthélem which after separating from the Guadeloupe jurisdiction, changed the status from Outermost region (OMR) to Overseas Country or Territory (OCT).

on both governmental and societal levels. It is argued that the decision of withdrawal was taken both from “the top” and “the bottom”, not necessarily out of the same logic. First, there was a decision of Greenland’s government to put the EEC membership suspension issue to a referendum followed by an intense pre-referendum campaign and only then came the decision of the majority of the society to vote against Greenland’s continued membership.

The interest of autonomy expansion supported by the belief of the economic prosperity outside the community is regarded as explanatory of government’s decision. The former was necessary but not sufficient condition, while the latter was a minimal condition and both together, they formed a sufficient condition for the decision against the EEC membership to be taken. On the societal level, the interest of preserving Greenlandic identity against the threat of Europeanization is claimed to have been decisive. It is argued, that the government manipulated with the fear of losing Greenlandicness to consolidate the Greenlandic society against the EEC membership through the pre-referendum campaign.

Statements are theoretically interpreted according to Alexander Wendt’s categories of *national interests* suggested in his book “Social Theory of International Politics”³. Wendt (1999) criticizes the neo-Realist (Waltz) zero-sum game construal according to which the physical survival is the states’ only national interest (p.235) and argues that states have at least three other interests: autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem (pp.235-236), all three relevant to Greenland’s case. Additionally, the Securitization Theory coined by Ole Waever (1995) and later developed by Buzan et. al (1998) is used as a theoretical framework elucidating the role of the pre-referendum campaign as an intermediate variable, which helped to demonize the EEC membership.

Two specific qualitative research methods are used in this article. These are Process Tracing and Discourse Analysis. Process tracing is “the use of evidence from within historical case to make inferences about causal explanation of that case” (Bennet and Checkel, 2012, p.2). This method allows defining the role that Greenland’s historical progress towards meeting the national interests of autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem played in Greenland’s ultimate decision to withdraw from the EEC. Additionally, discourse analysis is used to study the pre-referendum campaign as a securitization act. Due to the unfortunate lack of primary sources available for access, especially in English language, mainly the discourse cited in the secondary sources has been analysed, though the evidence provided is ample enough to enable the identification of the main trends.

Decision-making on the Governmental level

Autonomy: Greenland’s interest of autonomy expansion within the Kingdom of Denmark

According to Wendt (1999), “Autonomy refers to the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choice of government” (p.235). In consistence with this definition, this chapter applies the method of process tracing to reveal the explanatory power of Greenland’s interest in autonomy expansion over its decision to withdraw from the EEC. The process tracing follows Greenland on its way to the self-determination that is still ongoing and a final phase of which could even be the declaration of Statehood. Developments on the fishery front are traced alongside to manifest the political, and not only economic importance of Greenland’s local resources.

The mid 20th century modernization process in Greenland was accompanied by the increased Danish influence on Greenland’s daily life, hence reducing the local authority. Greenland’s modernization was planned in Copenhagen: “Greenland was in fact more than ever governed politically, economically, intellectually, and physically by another people” (as cited in Shadian, 2006, p.100). This period witnessed an upsurge of national consciousness. By 1953, Greenland was no longer a Danish colony but a constituent part of the Kingdom of Denmark (Orvik, 1984, p.939). Yet, that was only the beginning of the actual decolonization process. The progressive political elite teamed up in a Siumut party and began to work towards Greenland’s increased autonomy (Dahl 1986, p.320).

The 1972 EEC referendum was the first time when Greenlanders themselves had to decide the fate of Greenland’s foreign relations. 70% of the electorate voted against the integration into the Community. As Dahl (1986)

³ In this article, the understanding of the term ‘national interests’ is not limited to the actors the international status of which is an independent state

notes, the referendum results did not only reflect Greenland's negative attitude towards the EEC, but a resistance to any kind of outer dominance (p.320). However, the 50 000 Greenlandic votes were outweighed by 5 million total Danish votes in favour of the EEC membership (Dahl, 1986, p.320) and in 1973, Greenland, against the will of its population, became a EEC member. As Alfredsson (1982) phrased it, "Greenlanders now have to deal with two foreign capitals and bureaucracies, Copenhagen and Brussels, instead of one before" (p.292).

Representative authority in Copenhagen no longer proved enough for Greenland to put its voice through and the local parties initiated a campaign to gain the Home Rule. In the Danish parliament, Provincial Council or newspapers, Greenland's politicians were claiming Greenland's rights to self-determination (Dahl, 1986, p.320). Frustrated Greenlanders were asking for "more Greenlandic Greenland, i.e. a society that would be as Greenlandic as possible and as Danish as necessary" (Sorensen, 1995, p.101). Push for Greenland's enhanced independence proceeded with a Home Rule referendum in 1979. 63% of the electorate voted in favour of increased autonomy from Denmark (Naalakkersuisut-Government of Greenland, n.d). The act was signed and the Home Rule was delivered to Greenland on May 1, 1979. Even though it represented an appendix to Danish constitution, the Home Rule act stood above the Danish legislation and was partly treated as Greenland's constitution (Harhoff, 1994/5, p.63). According to the Home Rule Act, foreign relations remained under the competence of Danish central apparatus (section 11, 2) and the supremacy of the international agreements over national ones were acknowledged (section 10, 1), but Greenland was still offered a platform to express its point of view (section 11, 2). Encouraged by Home Rule formation, Greenland shortly began to work its way out of the EEC. Eurosceptic Siumut, that was already Greenland's ruling party, decided to hold a referendum on the EEC membership. The referendum took place in 1982, engaging 74,9% of Greenland's population. Votes resulted in 46,1% of the electorate in favour of maintaining the status quo (EEC membership) and 52% - against the membership (Johansen & Sorensen, 1983, p.272). Subsequently, Denmark submitted an application to the Commission asking Greenland's withdrawal from the EEC (Commission Communication, p.10). After two years of negotiations, Greenland officially left the Community and gained the status of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT).

It was an irregular practice for an autonomous unit in the international law. Generally, autonomy is understood as the freedom of action in internal affairs, while foreign affairs and defence is usually in the hands of the national governments. Equally, as noted above, the Home Rule Act had not delegated the power of foreign policymaking to Greenland, but Denmark still allowed Greenland to extend its Home Rule to include the freedom not to pursue Danish international course and leave the EEC.

By the end of the 20th century though, according to Göcke's (2009) assessment, Greenlanders decided that the Home Rule had already accomplished itself and the limits that this act set to Greenland's Landsstyre became unacceptable (p.110). Talks between the governments of Denmark and Greenland resulted in the formation of the Greenlandic-Danish Commission. "The Commission shall, on the basis of Greenland's present constitutional position and in accordance with the right of self-determination of the people of Greenland under international law, deliberate and make proposals for how the Greenland authorities can assume further powers, where this is constitutionally possible", - read the Commission's report (2008, p.4). Successively, on a referendum held on November 2008, Greenland's society had to decide on transforming the governance from the Home Rule to Self-Government, which meant a higher degree of independence. Out of 39 000 voters, 75,5% was in favour of the enhanced autonomy and only 23,6% - against (Göcke, 2009, p.103). In 2009, Act on Greenland Self-Government was enacted with Greenland's government taking over the responsibility for the management of the 32 spheres of governance including the judicial system, immigration and border control (Naalakkersuisut- the government of Greenland, n.d).

Against this background, the withdrawal from the EEC can be seen as yet another step for Greenland on its way to self-determination. As Kingsburry suggests "the realization of self-determination can take many forms and does not necessarily imply a State of their own" (Suksi, 1998, p.28). In case of Greenland, self-determination was realized in the forms of (a) criticism about the inclusion into EEC against the will of Greenland's electorate (referendum of 1972), (b) the establishment of the Home Rule (1979), (c) the referendum on the termination of the EEC membership (1982), (d) actual withdrawal from the EEC (1985) and (e) the formation of Self-government (2009). A final step of Greenland's determination may well be the eventual declaration of statehood, though weak economic basis makes self-government a more adequate model of governance for Greenland of today. "Independence is important, but not to the little child who goes to bed hungry, and there are a lot of children in Greenland like that", - opposition

leader Jens Frederiksen stated (Kucera, 2008, n.d.). Noteworthy in this regard are the oil and gas reserves in Greenland. In 2008, US Geological Survey (USGS) published the evaluation report of the oil and gas potential of the Arctic according to which, Greenlandic basins are appraised to be accumulating around 52 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas (Kay & Thorup, 2014, n.d.).⁴

	Oil (MMBO)	Total Gas (BCF)	NGL (MMBNGL)	BOE (MMBOE)
East Greenland Rift Basins	8,902	86,180	8,121	31,387
West Greenland - East Canada	7,274	51,818	1,153	17,063
North Greenland Sheared Margin	1,350	10,207	274	3,324
TOTAL	17,526	148,205	9,548	51,774

Source: *Andrews Kurth*

If oil and gas reserves turn out to be reality, and Greenland, on this basis, manages to develop self-reliant and sustainable economy, it is highly likely that the desire of autonomy-expansion will eventually lead Greenland to the independence by way of secession from Denmark. The 5th Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond (2013-2014) affirmed that "If Greenland becomes economically self-sufficient, the independence becomes a practical possibility. We know that we have gold and diamonds and oil and great masses of the cleanest water in the world. It may be closer than we think" (Howard, 2009, p.212). Hans-Hoachim Heintze explains that, "under certain conditions the people of the autonomous region can claim their right to self-determination and pursue their own state. In this case autonomy could be a first step towards creating a State of their own" (Suksi, 1998, p.30). For Greenland, economic self-sufficiency could serve as that "certain condition(s)" leading it from the Self-government to the statehood.

Regarding the second aspect of autonomy expansion interest, viz. the all-inclusive control over the local resources, the ruling party wished to be the one regulating the fishing rights across Greenland instead of the supranational body such as the EEC. In terms of the employment rate and its overall volume, the fishery has always been the leading industry of Greenland. At the time when the withdrawal from the EEC was set as the Landsstyre's priority, Greenland's workforce amounted to 25,000 persons out of which 2419 (11%) were employed in the fishing industry (Lyck & Taagholt, 1987, p.54). Accordingly, fish was a key local resource for Greenland on which to base its future self-sustaining economic growth and thus, its independence in the long run. Greenland's government found it restricting factor to be obliged "to ask for permission in Brussels to catch our own fish", - as Landsstyreman Moses Olsen declared at the Greenland-EEC conference (as cited in Johansen, Sorensen, 1983, p.277). Control over local natural resources was considered an essential attribute of the Home Rule, which, in Landsstyre's view, was undermined by the EEC policies. "The Greenland community wishes to demonstrate its viability by developing its economy on the basis of locally generated values. Hence, it is imperative for the Home Rule to reserve all catch and processing of fish for the local hands if the society with a viable economy is to become a reality", - reads the Landsstyre official statement 1981 (as cited in Harhoff, 1983, p.23).

On the other hand, for the increase in the production capacity, substantial investments were needed and they were in part covered by the grants and loans from the EEC. During its Community membership Greenland received 680 million Danish crowns in grants from the community funds plus the 330 million Danish crowns from the European Investment Bank in the same period (Johansen & Sorensen, 1983, p.270). Greenland also benefited from the access to the Common Market for its fishery products (Kramer, 1983, p.281). Noteworthy among the documents on Greenland's accession to the EEC is the protocol N4 that sets certain restrictions for the Community authority on the territory of Greenland (Kramer, 1983, p.274). Particularly, the document acknowledged the peculiarity of Greenland's fishing industry. The needs of Greenland's fishermen were given a priority and the 12-miles radius zone

⁴ See the original report on USGS Publications Warehouse, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>

around Greenland's coast was apportioned only to them (Kramer, 1983, p.275), - it suggests an important concession from the EEC side. Other countries, mainly West Germany, had access to other coastal waters in the 200-mile radius.

Nevertheless, it is often conveyed in the scholarship that Greenlanders were displeased with the excessive fishing of Community vessels in their waters (See, e.g. Alfredsson, 1983, p.292). As New York Times reported from Nuuk in 1982, there was "a widespread resentment with what is seen here as Common Market interference in purely Greenlandic affairs, especially in fishing, which is the backbone of the economy" (Borders, 1982). In fact, that what made common fisheries policy between the EEC and Greenland problematic, was the granting of fishing rights in Greenlandic waters to Community members such as Portugal, Norway and West Germany (Kramer, 1983, p.279) or several facts of EEC members' illegal fishing in Greenland's waters (Debate in the British House of Commons, 1984). The most distressing case for Greenland is said to be the one against the West Germany fishing vessels. Yet, it is known that later the German side repented the incidents and made a promise that the violations would not re-occur (Kramer, 1983, p.279). Besides, on the East coast there were adequately-equipped control units that could have been put in use to serve Greenland's case (Kramer, 1983, p.280). The opposition party Atassut also believed that this type of problems could have been eliminated through negotiations (Johansen & Sorensen, 1983, p.273), but Greenland did not wish to use the means at its disposal and cooperate.

If these few unpleasant for Greenland facts of the EEC fishery policy practice had been the cause of Greenland's disapproval of the Community, then the Landsstyre would have first of all tried to solve the problem inside the organization rather than directly outside of it. It, therefore, seems that "the real issue was politics rather than fish", similarly to Orvik's (1984) witty observation about the 1984 fishing agreement (p.952). Noteworthy in this regard is a case when granting of additional fishing quotas to West Germany in Greenland's East coast was met with resentment even if the Greenlanders themselves were not fishing in those waters (Kramer, 1983, p.280). The reason behind it could hardly have been economic. As in all other cases of Greenlanders' resentment traced above, it was all about Greenland's interest of the autonomy expansion.

To sum up, the process tracing showed where the withdrawal from the EEC stood on Greenland's way to the self-determination. Greenland entered the Community against the will of its society and upon the establishment of the Home Rule, withdrew in pursuance of the increased autonomy. Community membership had made Greenland doubly limited in policy-making, as it had to follow both Danish and ECC political or economic trajectories. Especially on the fishery front, Greenland was against any external authority over its waters since the fishing industry was seen as an economic basis for future self-governing Greenland. Hence, withdrawal from the Community was perceived by the Landsstyre as a way towards autonomy expansion, understood as the interest of consolidating the power of independent policymaking and obtaining all-inclusive control over its own local resources.

Economic well-being: Greenland's economic interest of withdrawal from the EEC

Wendt (1999) argues that the *Economic well-being* is about "the maintenance of the mode of production in a society and, by extension, the State's resource base", rather than necessarily the economic gain (p. 236). Correspondingly, via tracing the process of Greenland's decision-making in favour of the OCT status, it is demonstrated that the withdrawal from the EEC was not decided neither against any economic threat, nor in anticipation of any objective economic gain. The main idea behind the decision was to keep the economic prosperity already attained, though outside of the Community. The political status *vis-à-vis* the EEC was what mattered.

The reason why the Self-Rule proved the most acceptable form of self-determination for Greenland, as thoroughly assessed in the previous chapter, was the economic dependence on Denmark. As Taagholt and Claus (2001) assessed, "Some Greenlanders want a self-sufficient Greenland- independent of Denmark. Self-sufficiency, however, would mean that the standard of living in Greenland would have to drop significantly" (p.72). 57% of Greenland's state budget and 30% of its gross domestic product was furnished by the Danish state budget (Greenland's Statistics, n.d.). Three billion Danish kroner (about 600 million dollars), which is equal to 10 000 dollars per capita, went to Greenland government in the form of subsidies (Kucera, 2008, p.40). Similarly, the withdrawal from the EEC would mean the loss of the access to the common market and of the Community financial assistance.

In the years 1973-1981, Greenland as the EEC member had received substantial financial assistance in forms of grants from Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - more than 300 projects with 10 million ECU budget each, European Social Fund (ESF) - around 30 million ECU, European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee fund (EAGGF of FEOGA)

- more than 2 million ECU (Harhoff 1983, p.20) and loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) amounting 52,2 million ECU (Commission Communication, p.17). Up until September 1981, the EEC total investment in Greenland was 962 million Danish kroner (Kramer, 1983, p.275). Kramer (1983) accurately explains the risk that the withdrawal from the EEC carried for Greenland: "If it leaves the EC without special arrangement, the island would become a Third Country itself, and its products would be confronted with the CET, *et cetera*. In this case, one could imagine what difficulties the young Greenlandic export industry would have to extend its sales in the Community against fierce competition by (protected) EC fishermen..." (p.286). Then, it is interesting to know what economic justification did the decision to leave the EEC have for the fishing industry and overall, for Greenland? Having compared Greenland's attitude towards the EEC to that towards Denmark, there is a reason to believe that without a plan of economic well-being outside of the Community, the interest of autonomy expansion would not have translated into the decision to withdraw from the EEC, just as it has not yet led Greenland to the independence from Denmark.

Among the already existing practices of the EEC-Third Country relations, Greenland found the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) status the most promising as an economic security guarantee. It meant trade benefits (the tariff-free access of Greenland's fish and fishery products to the EEC common market) and financial and technical assistance from the European Development Fund (Kramer, 1983, p.288). Even more, Greenland aimed at these benefits without taking the responsibility of reciprocal commitments. In September 1982, on the annual conference of the Siumut party, Landsstyre declared that the attainment of the OCT status would not happen in exchange to the concession of rights to its waters to the EEC (Johansen & Sorensen, 1983, p.276). Explicitly, if the Community members wished to continue fishing in Greenland's waters, they would have to purchase licences.

The logic behind Landsstyre's decision to leave the Community was as follows: Greenland would re-gain control over the entire 200-mile zone and then sell the fishing rights on these territories to the interested EEC members. The ruling party believed it would compensate for the loss of financial aid from the Community after Greenland's withdrawal from it. Therefore, the Landsstyre would, as a minimum, manage to maintain the same level of economic well-being outside of the Community as Greenland had within it. Yet, this one-sided calculation was not to the EEC liking. The Community would not allow the *ex parte* agreement with Greenland to happen, as it would have led others to believe that all the EEC benefits could have been received even without taking the responsibility of Community membership. Negotiations over status lasted for 2 years following the 1982 referendum. Siumut party had to back down and eventually approve the fisheries agreement (1984) allowing the Community to fish in Greenland's waters. In exchange, Greenland still managed to secure free access to the common market and the financial assistance amounting 216 million kroner a year (Orvik, 198, p.951), which can be considered a beneficial deal for both sides. Greenland's interest of preserving the existing economic well-being was still met.

Against this background, it can be claimed that interest of Autonomy expansion was decisive, but the economic argument did matter! Greenlanders' courage of leaving the EEC was based on their expectation that the EEC financial assistance and fishery relations would continue in one form or another, beneficial to Greenland. Otherwise, Greenland could not afford to leave the Community. New York Times correspondent William Borders (1982) reported that time from Nuuk that "Greenlanders have been eager to negotiate some kind of associate status with the Common Market, which has provided up to \$20 million a year in aid, and their ability to do so may affect their determination to leave- the referendum was just advisory" (para.9), - emphasizing the importance of the economic factor. The fact that in 1984 the Landsstyre agreed to limit Greenland's control over local resources to the fisheries agreement with the Community is yet another argument proving the importance of economic considerations behind Greenland's interest of autonomy expansion.

When talking about the possibilities of Greenland's independence from Denmark Siumut speaker Jonathan Motzfeld stated: "independence would be conditional by Greenland's own capabilities to assure itself independent economic development and that thoughtful balance between political and economic considerations would be required (as cited in Taagholt and Claus, 2001, p.71). In the same manner, Greenland's decision to withdraw from the EEC had to be a result of weighing political cause against economic concerns.

In short, at the time of the decision-making, Landsstyre had an economic plan on which it based the political decision of the withdrawal from the EEC. Eventually, it turned into an economic security guarantee in the form of the OCT status and paved the way for the leading interest of autonomy expansion to materialize through the formal termination of Greenland's EEC membership in 1985. Withdrawal from the Community in favour of the OCT status was seen as a way of creating a politically independent and economically self-reliant Greenland.

Decision-making on the Societal Level

On a referendum of February 23rd, 1982, Greenlandic society had to choose to stay within the Community or to withdraw from it. The ruling party Siumut and the opposition party Atassut campaigned against each other for the termination and the maintenance of the EEC membership, respectively. Siumut believed that outside of the community, Greenland would manage to develop its economy based on the OCT status, while for Atassut, the fate of Greenland's economy was too uncertain to support the withdrawal. The two parties differently perceived Greenland's economic interest, but otherwise Atassut too was in favour of Greenland's autonomy expansion (Orvik, 1984, 943), just like all Greenlanders normally were. The ruling party was the one that succeeded and, on the question, "Do you want Greenland to remain a part of the European Communities" 52% of the electorate answered "no" (Harhoff, 1983, p.13).

On the first EEC referendum in 1972, 70% of Greenland's electorate voted against the Community membership, while for the second referendum in 1982 this percentage had reduced to 52%. The increased standard of living during those ten years is probably what accounts for that change of the attitude to +20% more positive. Besides, Greenlanders are a conservative type of voters, less likely to make economically risky decisions (Orvik, 1984, p.938). The electorate still chose to believe the Siumut version of events over that of more cautious Atassut.

Given the Landsstyre's weak economic argument in favour of the withdrawal from the EEC, the collective self-esteem is especially noteworthy as the national interest category most representative of the societal interest in Greenland. In other words, it is only to a limited extent that the results of the referendum of 1982 represent a continuation of the vote expressed 10 years earlier against the integration into EEC. The securitization of the collective identity is what proved decisive (See the sub chapter "Analyzing Securitization discourse in the 1982 EEC pre-referendum campaign).

Collective self-esteem: interest of preserving Greenlandicness against the threat of Europeanization

According to Lynge, the decade leading to the Home Rule was "characterized by a search for pride, self-consciousness and acceptance as an equal ethnic group" (as cited in Graugaard, 2009, p.15), or that what Alexander Wendt (1999) would call *the collective self-esteem*: "a group's need to feel good about itself, for respect or status" (p.235-236). Indeed, as already communicated in the first chapter, 1970s was a period of national awakening in Greenland and the beginning of Greenlandization as opposed to Danization of before and Europeanization that was to follow. The "psychic threat of not having standing" (Wendt, 1999, p.236) had paradoxically emerged as a result of Danish modernization policies (mid 20th century) that were negatively received in Greenland as an exertion of "Danization" (See chapter 1, Autonomy). The economic aid from Denmark had, on the one hand, improved living standards, but on the other hand, led to the loss of the traditional culture (Kramer, 1983, p.276). New York Times reporter from Greenland wrote that the "...traditional Eskimo culture has been shattered by 20th-century development, alienating many people from their own cultural heritage" (Borders, 1982a, para.9). Kramer (1983) sustains that the loss of one culture cannot be compensated by the acquisition of another one, even if it means better socio-economic state of affairs and that is why, he believes, the Greenlandic identity was over-emphasized (p. 276).

This article claims that the Community membership proved consequential for Greenlandic identity formation, this time against the threat of Europeanization. "Materially, life has become better in Greenland, but rapid development has caused social upheaval in what was just a generation ago was a conservative and traditional Eskimo society"- in 1982 New York Times reported from Greenland (Borders, 1982b, para.18). Former Prime Minister of Greenland, Jonathan Motzfeld, himself of Eskimo origin, stated: "but we are so remote from Europe in our attitudes as well as geography that we can never feel at home in the community" (as cited in Borders, 1982c, para.6). Johansen and Sorensen (1983) affirm that falling under the EEC regulations threatened Greenland's cultural identity (p.272). Another Eskimo-descent government figure in Greenland, Moses Olsen, declared: "We're not Europeans at all. Our ancestors were living isolated and at peace with themselves. They were strong and proud because they had to cope with a harsh environment, and they did it well. Then, 30 years ago, there began this destructive rush of development from Denmark. Many of them meant well, but our culture was sabotaged nonetheless. Our effort now must be to save the next generation" (as cited in Borders, 1982b, para.22).

Thus, the fact that the nation formation proceeded alongside Danization and Europeanization processes provoked the feelings of cultural insecurity among the local indigenous population. Especially after the establishment of the Home Rule, Kalaaliussuseq (Greenlandicness) was further accentuated. According to Graugaard's (2009) assessment, "the home rule...made way for new expressions of pride and self-confidence" (p.60), such as the withdrawal from the EEC, in this case Contrary to Danization, in case of Europeanization, Greenlanders' fear of cultural loss was even politically manifested. The ruling Siumut party waged a 1982 EEC pre-referendum campaign centred primarily on the societal interest of Collective self-esteem and succeeded. The EEC membership was perceived as a challenge to the Kalaaliussuseq (Greenlandicness), while the withdrawal from the Community, and thus detachment from Europe, was seen as a way of redeeming the weakened collective self-esteem.

Analysing the Securitization discourse in the 1982 EEC pre-referendum campaign

When reasoning about the possibilities of Greenland's separation from Denmark, Nil Orvik (1984) makes an interesting observation, which also perfectly fits the case of Greenland's withdrawal from the EEC: "Full independence and separation from Denmark cannot hope to succeed unless they can find ... some highly emotional issues that appeal directly to people's fears and hopes for the future in order to fuel a combined hope and hate campaign" (p.939). In case of the 1982 pre-referendum campaign this kind of issue appeared to be Greenlandicness.

According to Johansen and Sorensen (1983), the pre-referendum "campaign became long, costly and - in contrast to Greenland's traditions - harsh and bitter. Much of the written campaign material reflected an attitude of anger and disappointment" (p.272). The ruling party Siumut chose to manipulate with emotions: an image of the EEC as an enemy to Greenlandicness was shaped. Apart from the statements by the government officials analysed in the previous chapter, the threat to the Kalaaliussuseq was also communicated through the emotionally loaded photos: "One pro-withdrawal sign, plastered up on the sides of hundreds of buildings, showed three Eskimos in kayaks breaking the heavy black chains that bound the map of Greenland to the map of Europe, as they triumphantly towed the island out of the European sphere", the sign read 'Heritage Must Be Strengthened'- as testified by the New York Times journalist from the place (Borders, 1982c, para.13). As for the opposition, members of the Atassut party were campaigning in favour of the continued EEC membership emphasizing such economic benefits as the high employment and development level, access to the common market, financial assistance, etc. "Campaign literature ... stressed the developmental gains that have accompanied membership. Posters showed a sick boy or an elderly woman or a young married couple looking for a place to live, with the caption, "Remember us and vote 'yes.'", - William Borders from NYT reported from Greenland during the campaign in 1982 (Borders, 1982b, para.17).

Emotions vs. Reason appears to be a normal trend for the EEC-referendums. In his review of the 1972 Danish pre-referendum campaign, instructively titled as "No side speaks to the emotions, yes side to reason", Hans Redder observes a similar strategy. Redder's (2012) hypothesis is that "EU-enthusiastic politicians, economists and businesses talk about the economic necessity of a yes. But sceptic's arguments about national pride, identity and independence appeals to voters" (Para 1.). Evidently, this statement is valid in Greenland's case as well. Prof. Olesen examines the same 1972 EEC referendum in Denmark and explains: "It has always been difficult for the yes side as they had always had to argue for some benefits we could have.... The no-side, by contrast, argued with the fear of losing what we had" (as cited in Redder, 2012, para 14). Similarly, in Greenland, the Atassut party was using the economic benefits of the EEC membership as arguments in favour of the Community, while Siumut was manipulating with the threat of losing Greenlandicness (Gain vs. Loss). Anti-Europeans can take their messages close to the hearts of the people as "it's easier to talk oppositional and to play on some strong emotions rather than trying to convince people to be 'economically responsible' on a poster", - Danish researcher Lars Sybdahl explains why emotional arguments always win (as cited in Redder, 2012, para.12), as it did in Greenland.

The pre-referendum campaign held by Siumut party can be seen as a good example of *Securitization*. Securitization theory follows the logic of Constructivism and makes an important contribution to the understanding of the social construction of threats. Securitization means presenting issue as if it were "threatening in such a way that others listen and are convinced or are at least persuaded to pay attention to the issue (Eriksson & Noreen, 2002, p.10). A securitizing actor securitizes a referent object in the eyes of a certain audience and "if and when the audience accepts it as such" the securitization move proves successful, i.e. "the issue is securitized" (Buzan, Weaver & Wilde, 1998, p.25). *Securitizing actor* is the one responsible for the securitization act, , while *referent objects* are "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde,

1998, p.36). Accordingly, Securitizing actor would be the ruling party Siumut; Referent object - Greenlandicness and the target audience -Greenland's society (electorate). Eventually, the results of the referendum in favour of the withdrawal can be interpreted as the 'acceptance' from the side of the audience, meaning a successful securitization act.

According to Buzan et al., it is a common practice for governments to use national identity as a referent object in a securitization act (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p.123). As Weaver (1995) notes, it happens so because "a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live as itself" (p.67) and these fears can be easily exploited. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that "Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes may be seen as invasive or heretical and their sources pointed to as existential threat" (p.23), in a manner that Europeanization was represented as a threat to Greenlandicness (See the chapter on "Collective self-esteem").

On the whole, along the political and economic considerations, the interest of Collective self-esteem provided Greenland with yet another reason to leave the EEC – 'psychic'! Wendt (1999) explains that "Most of the time states do not find themselves in hotel fires, in which case a variety of beliefs about how to meet security needs may be compatible with the national interest" (p.237). In Greenland, the belief was that the withdrawal from the EEC was a way to meet Greenland's security needs, material or psychic, and it proved compatible with to all three Wendt's (1999) national interest categories: Autonomy, Economic well-being and Collective self-esteem (pp.233-238).

Conclusion

The article was aimed at offering a qualitative analysis of Greenland's decision to leave the European Economic Community. The rationale behind the decision to withdraw from the EEC was sought on both governmental and societal levels. It was claimed that the government's decision to opt out of the Community stemmed from the interest of autonomy expansion, backed by the plan of economic well-being outside the EEC. On the societal level though, the interest in preserving Greenlandicness (Kalaaliussuseq) was considered decisive. These findings were concurrently interpreted according to Alexander Wendt's classification of National Interests into the categories of 'autonomy', 'economic well-being' and 'collective self-esteem' (the interest of physical survival was considered irrelevant for the study). Eventually, a conclusion was made that the withdrawal from the EEC was a way for Greenland to meet these three types of national interests by one political move. On the governmental level, the focus was on the categories of 'autonomy' and 'economic well-being', while on the societal level, the importance was attached to the interest of 'collective self-esteem'.

The argumentation was based on the method of process tracing, which followed Greenland's political developments from its inclusion into the EEC to the declaration of the self-government to find that the withdrawal from the Community represented yet another step on Greenland's way towards self-determination. It was also demonstrated that Greenlanders' strive for the statehood is circumscribed by the economic dependence on Denmark and that only if and when Greenland becomes economically self-sufficient, it can afford the independence. Having named economic factor as the major deterrent to Greenland's self-determination, balance between the political and economic considerations behind Greenland's decision to leave the EEC was studied. In case of the withdrawal from the Community, in contrast to the hypothetical case of Greenland's separation from Denmark, the government had an economic back up plan: attainment of the OCT status and selling the fishing licenses to the interested EEC members, thus compensating for the lost financial aid from the Community. Process tracing in this case led to the conclusion that the Landsstyre's belief in the maintenance of the existing level of economic well-being outside the community paved the way to the interest of Autonomy expansion to be realized through the termination of the EEC membership.

In the next section, the link between Greenland's attitude towards the so called Danization and Europeanization was established to demonstrate the ramifications that the modernization and the economic development imposed from the outside had on the collective self-esteem of the local indigenous population. With the discourse analysis, it was later exposed how the Greenlanders' resentment of being deprived of Greenlandicness was given political direction through the anti-EEC pre-referendum campaign held by the ruling party Siumut. Wæver's (1995) Securitization Theory was used to theoretically present this argument as follows: the ruling party consolidated Greenlanders against the EEC membership by representing the latter as an existential threat to Greenlandicness. As a result of the

securitization move made by the Siumut, Greenlanders decided that their historical self-image was threatened by Europe. The majority of votes against the EEC membership indicate a successful securitization act.

Therefore, the two-levelled analysis of the decision-making process offered a comprehensive understanding of the reasons and processes underlying Greenland's decision to leave the EEC as a whole. Wendt's categories of national interests provided a sufficient theoretical framework for explicating the rationale behind both governmental and societal decisions to leave the EEC in their constructivist substance, but the theoretical added-value of the Securitization theory was its effectiveness in showing the process itself.⁵

What is more, Greenland's withdrawal from the EEC adds to the understanding of the confines of 'autonomy' as a legal category, in that Denmark gave Greenland the right not to follow the Danish international trajectory and to opt out of the EEC. It would be thus interesting to further examine this case as a legal precedent on which the territorial units within the existing EU member states (such as Spain) or former one (United Kingdom) could possibly rely. Can the "reverse Greenland" scenario be applied to Catalonia, so that it could remain in the European Union in case of gaining independence from Spain? Or could the autonomy of Northern Ireland or Scotland be similarly expanded so that they could individually become part the European Union, with the United Kingdom being out? With all these possible conjectures, Greenland's case merits renewed and more specialized scholarly attention, especially legal.

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⁵ Securitization theory is the work of the Copenhagen school of thought but is also constructivist in its essence

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